Seattle Journal for Social Justice
Volume 10

Issue 2

Article 8

April 2012

Getting Back to Our 'Roots': Why the Use of Cutting Edge Forensic
Technology in the Courtroom Should (and Can) Still be
Constrained by the Plain Language of the Confrontation Clause
Lucie Bernheim

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/sjsj

Recommended Citation
Bernheim, Lucie (2012) "Getting Back to Our 'Roots': Why the Use of Cutting Edge Forensic Technology in
the Courtroom Should (and Can) Still be Constrained by the Plain Language of the Confrontation Clause,"
Seattle Journal for Social Justice: Vol. 10: Iss. 2, Article 8.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/sjsj/vol10/iss2/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Publications and Programs at Seattle
University School of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Seattle Journal for Social Justice
by an authorized editor of Seattle University School of Law Digital Commons.

887

Getting Back to Our ‘Roots’: Why the Use of
Cutting Edge Forensic Technology in the
Courtroom Should (and Can) Still be Constrained
by the Plain Language of the Confrontation Clause
Lucie Bernheim
INTRODUCTION
The use of scientific evidence such as DNA tests in court . . . brings
into collaboration two institutions with significantly different aims
and normative commitments. . . . Lawmakers’ expectations of science
to simply step in and cure the law’s deficiencies, without taking into
account the disparate dynamics of the two institutions, are
exaggerated, . . . and, at the limit, lead to questionable justice.1
In 2001, Elaina Boussiacos’s body was found in the trunk of her car near her
home in Woodinville, Washington.2 Sione Lui, an ex-boyfriend of the
decedent, was considered a suspect.3 Nine identifiable fingerprints, a small
bloodstain, and a trace of DNA on the steering wheel were found at the scene,
none of which matched those of Mr. Lui’s or Ms. Boussiacos’s.4 A small
number of sperm cells that matched Mr. Lui were found on the decedent’s
underwear and vaginal swab. It was unclear how long the cells had been
present; indeed, it was conceded that they could have been there for a “long
time.”5 A private DNA testing company, Orchid Cell Mart, tested the DNA.6

1

Sheila Jasanoff, Just Evidence: The Limits of Science in the Legal Process, 34 J.L. MED.
& ETHICS 328, 329 (2006).
2
Corrected Appellant’s Opening Brief at 2, State v. Lui, 221 P.3d 948 (Wash. Ct. App.
2009), petition for cert. granted, 228 P.3d 17 (Wash. 2010) (No. 84045-8).
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
State v. Lui, 221 P.3d 948, 951 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009), petition for cert. granted, 228
P.3d 17 (Wash).

888 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

The state did not initially charge Mr. Lui, and the case remained “unsolved”
until 2007.7 In 2007, detectives spoke with Mr. Lui again.8 During this
meeting, Mr. Lui made statements inconsistent with those he had made in
2001, but did not confess to anything.9 Based on both the evidence gathered
just after the crime in 2001 and his inconsistent statements, Mr. Lui was
charged with the murder six years after Ms. Boussiacos was killed.10
At trial, the report showing a DNA profile from the crime scene that
matched that of Mr. Lui was not admitted into evidence, and the lab analyst
that produced it did not testify.11 Instead, the results of the DNA report were
introduced through the testimony of Gina Pineda, an associate director at
Orchid Cell Mart, as an expert witness.12 Ms. Pineda gave testimony that
included her opinions and conclusions based on the reports, even though she
had not been involved with the testing process.13 Mr. Lui objected to this
practice, arguing that his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against
him had been violated because he had not had the opportunity to crossexamine the DNA lab analyst who had produced the report; cross-examining
Ms. Pineda was no substitute.14 The trial court disagreed, and Mr. Lui was
convicted of second-degree murder.15
The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division I, affirmed, stating that Mr.
Lui’s confrontation rights were not violated because “the evidence against Lui
was [Ms. Pineda’s] opinion—not [the] underlying data.”16 Since Mr. Lui had
the opportunity to cross-examine Ms. Pineda regarding her opinion, the court

7

Appellant’s Reply Brief at 1, State v. Lui, 221 P.3d 948 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009), petition
for cert. granted, 228 P.3d 17 (Wash. 2010) (No. 84045-8).
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Lui, 221 P.3d at 955 .
12
Id. at 951.
13
Id. at 955.
14
Id. at 953.
15
Id. at 949.
16
Id. at 955.
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reasoned, the confrontation clause was satisfied.17 The Washington State
Supreme Court granted certiorari, and it heard the case on September 14,
2010.18 The court has not issued an opinion, but the outcome will likely depend
on how the Supreme Court of the United States decides Williams v. Illinois,
which is currently pending.19 Mr. Lui’s predicament, therefore, is an example
of the latest question that the US Supreme Court has had the opportunity to
answer in a relatively new line of confrontation clause cases—who is required
to testify to satisfy the confrontation clause?20
The confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the US Constitution
provides that, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right .
. . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”21 This right is unique in
that it is only afforded to the accused in criminal cases.22 The defendant’s right
to confront witnesses against him, or to cross-examine witnesses, is commonly
recognized as an invaluable tool for exposing witness incompetency or
dishonesty.23
Despite the amendment’s seemingly clear language (“shall enjoy the
right”),24 until 2004, the confrontation of a witness with adverse testimony was
not required if the witness was unavailable and the trial judge decided that the

17

Id. at 956.
Washington State Supreme Court: State v. Liu (TVW television broadcast, Sept. 14, 2010,
1:30 PM), available at
http://www.tvw.org/media/mediaplayer.cfm?evid=2010090059C&TYPE=V&CFID=754579
&CFTOKEN=79754641&bhcp=1.
19
Williams v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 3090 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 80 BNW
U.S.L.W. 3003 (U.S. June 28, 2011) (No. 10-8505). Oral argument occurred on December 6,
2011. See Williams v. Illinois, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/casefiles/cases/williams-v-illinois/ (last visited Apr. 30, 2012).
20
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557
U.S. 305 (2009).
21
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
22
Id.
23
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 57 (2004) (“The substance of the constitutional
protection is preserved to the prisoner in the advantage he has once had of seeing the witness
face to face, and of subjecting him to the ordeal of cross-examination.”).
24
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
18
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testimony was reliable.25 Ohio v. Roberts provided that testimony could be
deemed reliable if it either fell within a hearsay exception or showed
“particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”26 The US Supreme Court
reasoned that if the right to confrontation operated to ensure reliability of outof-court statements, then the constitutional requirement could be disposed of
when a judge had already determined that the evidence was reliable.27
In 2004, the United States Supreme Court overturned Ohio v. Roberts in
Crawford v. Washington. The Court held that the admission of “testimonial
hearsay” is clearly prohibited by the confrontation clause unless the witness is
both unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity for crossexamination.28 Six years after Crawford, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts
elaborated on whether “forensic certificates of analysis” qualify as
testimonial.29 Determining whether forensic evidence is “testimonial hearsay,”
which governs when a defendant can invoke her right to confront, is
particularly important because of the perceived infallibility of forensic
evidence—especially DNA test results.30
In a case like that of Mr. Lui, exposing lab analyst incompetency,
inexperience, bias, or dishonesty through cross-examination is one of the
25

Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). The Court noted, however, that a showing of
unavailability is not always required. An earlier case, Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970),
had “found the utility of trial confrontation so remote that it did not require the prosecution
to produce a seemingly available witness.” Id. at 65 n.7.
26
Id. at 63–64, 66.
27
Id.
28
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S.
813 (2006); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
29
The “certificates of analysis” were sworn certificates of state laboratory analysts stating
that material seized by police was cocaine of a certain quality. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at
321–22.
30
See Jasanoff, supra note 1, at 328 (noting that modern society believes that “science can
deliver failsafe, and therefore just, legal outcomes where the law, acting on its own, might
fall short”). Jasonoff suggests that one reason for the perceived infallibility of science is the
notion that science establishes truth through non-human instruments, such as a lie detector or
an identification technique. Id. at 331–32. Unfortunately, the risk of human error can never
actually be removed, since such non-human instruments are made “to speak” only with the
aid of trained professionals. Id. at 330.
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defendant’s few tools for undermining such damning evidence. While DNA
evidence can be extremely accurate, it is not immune from human error.
Erroneous results are not uncommon due to risks like cross contamination, the
DNA analyst’s subjective and often inaccurate interpretation of the test results,
or completely fabricated results (“cooking the data”).31 Ironically, as DNA
testing technology becomes more sensitive and can pick up smaller traces of
cells, the risk of contamination from lab equipment, technicians, or other
samples is more likely.32 While there is a widespread belief “that science can
deliver failsafe [sic], and therefore just, legal outcomes where the law, acting
on its own, might fall short,”33 a more realistic expectation for science’s role in
legal proceedings is that forensic tests and results are simply pieces of
evidence. Results of a DNA test are no different from any other evidence. “It is
the product of human beings, with the same potential prejudices and
inconsistencies inherent in any human expression.”34 Just as an eyewitness
may be impeached at trial, so a forensic result should be prodded and poked by
the defense on cross-examination of the lab analyst who performed the test to
uncover, for example, the analyst’s biases or inadequacies. Without adequate
cross-examination, jurors are likely to view forensic evidence as much more
probative than it actually is.
While the forensic community has recently received negative attention for a
range of serious problems, most notably in a 2009 report by the National
Academy of Sciences,35 the use of forensic testing in the criminal justice

31

SHELDON KRIMSKY & TANIA SIMONCELLI, GENETIC JUSTICE: DNA DATA BANKS,
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 298 (2011).
32
Id. at 278.
33
Jasanoff, supra note 1, at 328.
34
KRIMSKY & SIMONCELLI, supra note 31, at 7–8.
35
COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCI. COMTY., NAT’L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD
(2009), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf (noting that
forensic testing systems around the country are lacking in standards and certification
programs).
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system is continuing to increase dramatically.36 In the past fifteen years, DNAbased identification has come to be heavily relied upon by law enforcement.37
For example, the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), a computer DNA
data bank overseen by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, connects DNA
databases of all fifty states.38 Originally, the data banks were meant to hold the
DNA profiles of only violent felons and recidivist sex offenders.39 Since
CODIS’s inception in 1990, however, state DNA data bank development has
increased significantly. There is a growing emphasis on the inclusion of
profiles of juvenile offenders, misdemeanants, and individuals who are
arrested but never convicted. Besides the stigmatizing impact of being present
in CODIS, an individual whose profile is on CODIS is more likely to be
considered a suspect in a crime (because of the likelihood of a “match”) than
an individual whose profile is not in the database. While this article only
explores the use of DNA at trial, it is relevant to note that DNA is increasingly
being used as a surveillance tool through data banks.
Finally, because of the nature of cases where DNA evidence is usually used,
the stakes are likely to be extremely high for the defendant. Since DNA residue
is found in blood, hair, skin cells, saliva, and semen, DNA testing is often used
in rape and murder trials after such materials are left behind. Consequently, the
defendant’s punishment, if convicted, is likely to be severe. Moreover, the
American judicial system’s emphasis on the principle of finality makes it
increasingly difficult to reopen a conviction:40 “While state authorities have
fully embraced the use of DNA to place individuals behind bars, some have
been far more reluctant to open the door to post-conviction DNA testing.”41
36
See Id. at 41. This article groups DNA analysis with other methods of forensic testing
even though DNA analysis is “considered the most reliable forensic tool available today.”
Id. at 47. Though reliable, it is not foolproof, and laboratories testing DNA can still make
errors “such as mislabeling samples, losing samples, or misinterpreting data.” Id.
37
KRIMSKY & SIMONCELLI, supra note 31, at xvi.
38
Id. at 29.
39
Id. at 28.
40
Id. at 329.
41
Id.
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With such high stakes, and with the importance of seriously questioning the
accuracy of the DNA evidence before the conviction, confrontation of the
DNA analyst who performed the test is essential.
Citing efficiency and economic concerns, as well as the neutral and
infallible nature of forensic evidence, however, some states have been
extremely hesitant to fully comply with Crawford and Melendez-Diaz in the
forensic context. For the various reasons discussed below, the analyst who
prepared the forensic report, like in State v. Lui, is not always required to
appear in court and be subject to cross-examination. On the other hand, several
cities have required the analyst who conducted the test to appear in court in all
or most cases, demonstrating that other states’ concerns about overwhelming
cost and inefficiency may be largely unfounded.42 Any increase in the burden
on states to require the analyst to appear in every case, however, is a
constitutionally required cost.43 The more that non-complying states are able to
evade the Supreme Court’s newly articulated constitutional requirements
regarding confrontation and forensic testing, the more defendants are subjected
to unconstitutional practices.
This article argues that the defendant has the right to confront the analyst
who conducted the forensic test; in-court testimony from an analyst’s
supervisor or an expert witness who was not directly involved is insufficient.
Further, in order to answer the question of who is required to testify regarding
the results of a forensic test under the confrontation clause (a question
currently before both the Washington State Supreme Court in State v. Lui and
the Supreme Court of the United States in Williams v. Illinois), courts should

42

Examples of cities that already have a practice of calling the analysts who examined the
evidence, drew the conclusion, or wrote the report are: Baltimore, Maryland; Denver,
Colorado; San Francisco, California; Oakland, California; Seattle, Washington; Chicago,
Illinois; and Anchorage, Alaska.
43
Brief for Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011) (No. 09-10876)
[hereinafter Bullcoming Amici Curiae Brief by defender organizations].
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look to the plain language of the confrontation clause44 and the basic principles
underlying the recent Crawford, Davis, and Melendez-Diaz decisions regarding
what is testimonial hearsay. Based on the principles contained in those
decisions, the defendant has the right to confront the analyst who conducted
the test. In-court testimony from an analyst’s supervisor or an expert witness
who was not involved in the testing is insufficient because it shields the analyst
who actually performed the test from cross-examination, while still allowing
the analyst’s testimony to threaten a defendant’s liberty. Confronting a witness
may not be a perfect science, but forensic test results should not replace it.
Part I provides a brief history of the confrontation clause up to Davis v.
Washington and sets out principles the Court should continue to apply in
Williams v. Illinois.45 Part II addresses the intersection of new confrontation
requirements and forensic evidence, focusing on both the majority and
dissenting opinions in Melendez-Diaz to emphasize that changes in how we
think of scientific evidence and in the forensic testing structure itself are
necessary to ensure that criminal defendants have a meaningful right to
confront witnesses against them. Part III examines Bullcoming v. New
Mexico46 and Williams v. Illinois47 to illustrate how some states are evading the
Crawford and Melendez-Diaz requirements when determining who is required
to testify under the confrontation clause. Finally, Part IV describes the systems
in states that have successfully complied with the principles of Crawford and
Melendez-Diaz—“the sky has not fallen,” as noted by the majority in the
Bullcoming opinion.48 Part IV also recommends changes in non-complying

44
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . .
. to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”).
45
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
46
Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
47
Williams v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 3090 (2011).
48
Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2719. Though costs and inefficiency are irrelevant once a
constitutional right has been recognized, the issue has affected how courts have dealt with
lab analyst testimony requirements, and so it should be addressed.
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states’ forensic structures and procedures that could make compliance easier
while decreasing the risk of inadvertent error.

I. A HISTORY OF SIGNIFICANT CONFRONTATION PRECEDENT
A. Why Cross-Examination Is Important: The Treason Trial of Sir Walter
Raleigh to the Cross-Examination Skills of Perry Mason
In reaction to a case involving Sir Walter Raleigh in 1603 and others like it,
English laws developed practices that limited ex parte abuses by ensuring the
right of the accused to confront every adverse witness, face to face.49 Raleigh
was accused of conspiring to kill James I.50 Raleigh’s alleged accomplice, Lord
Cobham, had implicated him without notice to or argument from the defense—
a record of Cobham’s statements was simply read to the jury during Raleigh’s
trial.51 Raleigh demanded that the judges call Cobham to appear, suspecting he
would recant, stating that “[t]he proof of the common law is by witness and
jury: let Cobham be here, let him speak it. Call my accuser before my face.”52
Raleigh’s request was denied; the jury convicted him of treason and he was
sentenced to death without ever having the opportunity to confront Cobham.53
Looking to this English precedent, the confrontation clause was included in
the proposal that became the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.54 The Supreme Court first spoke to cross-examination in a
criminal case as a core component of the confrontation right in Mattox v.
United States: “[t]he substance of the constitutional protection is preserved to
the prisoner in the advantage he has once had of seeing the witness face to

49
50
51
52
53
54

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 44–45 (2004).
Id. at 44.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 49.
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face, and of subjecting him to the ordeal of a cross-examination. This, the law
says, he shall under no circumstances be deprived of.”55
More recently, Earle Stanley Gardner popularized cross-examination
through the Perry Mason mystery novels. Perry Mason represented, for the
most part, defendants charged with crimes that they in fact did not commit.
While exceptionally idealized, Perry Mason’s character represents the longheld faith that the legal system has in the impact of cross-examination in
revealing witness dishonesty, incompetence, and incredibility—crossexamination is as much about testing the witness’s perceptions and memory as
it is about testing his or her sincerity.56
B. Pointer v. Texas, the Federal Rules of Evidence, and Ohio v. Roberts—the
Confrontation Clause’s Relation to Hearsay, and Emphasis on Reliability
Despite its history and lofty depictions in the media, the confrontation clause
was relatively underdeveloped until recently.57 Previously, courts depended on
the common law of hearsay to determine whether evidence could be admitted
without a testifying witness.58 “Hearsay” is defined as an out-of-court
statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted59 and is inadmissible
unless it falls within an exception.60 Rules governing admissibility of out-ofcourt statements are subject to exceptions based upon principles of reliability.61

55

Jules Epstein, Cross-Examination: Seemingly Ubiquitous, Purportedly Omnipotent, and
‘At Risk’, 14 WIDENER L. REV. 427, 432 (2009) (emphasis added).
56
Frederick Schauer, Can Bad Science Be Good Evidence? Neuroscience, Lie Detection,
and Beyond, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1191, 1195 (2010); Fred O. Smith, Jr., Crawford’s
Aftershock: Aligning the Regulation of Nontestimonial Hearsay with the History and
Purposes of the Confrontation Clause, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1497, 1518 (2008).
57
Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L.J. 1011,
1014 (1998).
58
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
59
FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
60
FED. R. EVID. 802.
61
FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note.
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The common law of hearsay was furthered by the adoption of Federal Rules of
Evidence in 1975, which was subsequently adopted by most states.62
In Pointer v. Texas, the Supreme Court finally held that the confrontation
clause is applicable to the states.63 Not much changed, however; as one scholar
pointed out, “shortly after Pointer the Court tended to emphasize the extent to
which the confrontation clause and hearsay doctrines are distinct[,] . . . [after
Ohio v. Roberts in 1980,] the Court . . . emphasized the extent to which they
are similar.”64
Indeed, in Ohio v. Roberts, the scope of the law of hearsay and the
confrontation clause were completely integrated.65 The Supreme Court held
that an admission at trial of an absent witness’s preliminary hearing testimony
did not violate a defendant’s confrontation right when the witness was
unavailable and the statement bore adequate “indicia of reliability.”66 Herschel
Roberts, the defendant in that case, was charged with forgery of a check and
possession of stolen credit cards.67 At the preliminary hearing, the witness in
question testified that she knew the respondent, but did not allow Mr. Roberts
to use the checks and credit cards in question.68 The witness was unavailable
for the trial, but the trial court admitted the transcript of her preliminary
testimony anyway over Mr. Roberts’s confrontation objections.69 Ultimately,
he was convicted on all counts.70
Deeming the admission of the statement proper, the Roberts Court reasoned
that the point of the confrontation clause was to ensure accuracy in criminal
proceedings. As long as a court only admitted reliable hearsay, there was no
62

Friedman, supra note 57, at 1020.
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407–08 (1965).
64
Richard D. Friedman, Crawford, Davis, and Way Beyond, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 553, 555
(2007).
65
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
66
Id.
67
Id. at 58.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 60.
70
Id.
63
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need for cross-examination. Reliability was to be determined either by looking
to the hearsay exceptions in the Federal Rules of Evidence or by allowing the
judge to subjectively determine whether the evidence displayed “particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness.”71 According to the Court, because “hearsay
rules and the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar
values,” it could rely on hearsay to determine what was reliable.72
Despite the Constitution’s clear preference for assessing reliability through
confrontation, Roberts attempted to arrive at the desired result of reliability
through a different framework. After Roberts and until 2004, the admission of
hearsay against a defendant hinged only upon the rules of hearsay and a
judge’s subjective assessment of the reliability of the evidence, in spite of the
Constitution’s clear language to the contrary. This subjective test proved to be
too much for the Court and came to a head in Crawford v. Washington.
C. Crawford v. Washington and Davis v. Washington—a Shift from a Focus
on Reliability to a New Focus on the Definition of “Testimonial”
In Crawford v. Washington, the Court held that the confrontation clause bars
the admission of any testimonial hearsay when the witness does not appear at
trial unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity
for cross-examination.73 Completely replacing the Roberts subjective
reliability test, the admissibility of unconfronted evidence now hinges on what
the Court considers “testimonial” hearsay. In Crawford, Michael Crawford had
stabbed a man who he claimed attempted to rape his wife, Sylvia Crawford.74
While in police custody, Ms. Crawford gave a tape-recorded statement to the
police; the State used the recording at trial, and Mr. Crawford did not crossexamine his wife.75

71
72
73
74
75

Id. at 66.
Id.
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
Id. at 38.
Id. at 40, 65.
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At trial, the court admitted the statement because it found it trustworthy
under the Roberts standard and convicted Mr. Crawford.76 The Washington
Court of Appeals reversed, applying a nine-factor test to assess reliability and
determining that Ms. Crawford’s statements were not reliable.77 The
Washington Supreme Court reversed again, concluding that the statements
were reliable under Roberts.78 The United States Supreme Court reversed yet
again, abrogating the Roberts test and stating that the lower courts’ decisions
in Crawford were “a self-contained demonstration of Roberts’ unpredictable
and inconsistent application.”79
The Court criticized the Roberts test for its unpredictability and for
collapsing the hearsay doctrine and the confrontation requirements together.80
The Roberts reliability test was overly broad in that it applied whether or not
the statement or declaration in question was testimonial hearsay—thus
subjecting to constitutional scrutiny statements that are “far removed” from the
concerns of confrontation such as offhand, informal statements not made in
anticipation of litigation.81 In addition, the test was too narrow in that it
allowed unconfronted testimony to be admitted if it was found reliable because
it fell under an established hearsay exception or was deemed trustworthy by
the judge.82 The clause’s ultimate goal, according to the Crawford court, was
not only to ensure reliability, but to guarantee a defendant the right to ensure
the reliability of testimonial evidence against him through a specific process:
confrontation.83 Therefore, if a piece of evidence is testimonial, whether it falls

76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83

Id. at 40.
Id. at 41.
Id. at 41; State v. Crawford, 54 P.3d 656, 664 (Wash. 2002), rev’d, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 66, 68.
Id. at 63.
Id. at 60.
Id.
Id. at 61.
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into a state or federal hearsay exception is irrelevant for purposes of the
confrontation clause.84
Most criticism of Crawford is directed at its less-than-complete definition of
what courts should consider testimonial85—some have even argued that
Crawford simply replaced one subjective test with another.86 However, the
Court did provide some preliminary guidelines regarding what should be
considered testimonial, which “share a common nucleus and then define the
Clause’s coverage at various levels of abstraction around it.”87 Specifically, the
Court cited three testimonial categories: “ex parte in-court testimony or its
functional equivalent,” which includes affidavits, custodial examinations, prior
testimony, or “statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used
prosecutorily”;88 “extrajudicial statements contained in formalized materials,
such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions”;89 and
“statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available
for use at a later trial. ”90
The Court’s somewhat nebulous definition of “testimonial” has been
defended on the grounds that the rule is extremely new, and it cannot be
expected that all significant questions be resolved right away.91 The Court
recognized that its non-exhaustive list may cause uncertainty, but it excused its

84

John H. Blume & Emily C. Paavola, Crime Labs and Prison Guards: A Comment on
Melendez-Diaz and Its Potential Impact on Capital Sentencing Proceedings, 3 CHARLESTON
L. REV. 205, 212 (2009).
85
See, e.g., Aviva Orenstein, Sex, Threats, and Absent Victims: The Lessons of Regina v.
Bedingfield for Modern Confrontation and Domestic Violence Cases, 79 FORDHAM. L.
REV. 115, 135 (2010); Henry F. Fradella, Unraveling Crawford in Abuse Cases, 42 No. 1
Crim. Law Bulletin ART 6 (2006).
86
Michael D. Cicchini, Judicial (In)discretion: How Courts Circumvent the
Confrontation Clause under Crawford and Davis, 75 TENN. L. REV. 753, 778 (2008).
87
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51–52 (2004).
88
Id. at 51.
89
Id. at 51–52.
90
Id. at 52.
91
Friedman, supra note 64, at 555.
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own shortcoming because the result could "hardly be worse than [Roberts].”92
Indeed, the Court may have been more ambiguous than necessary in order to
avoid the pigeonholing of testimonial categories and to encourage lower courts
to consider the motivation behind Crawford—that the truth-seeking purpose of
a criminal trial is undermined by admitting incriminating evidence without first
providing an opportunity for cross-examination of the witness that produced
it—and apply its rule, even if the evidence is not specifically listed as with a
testimonial category.93 Still, the ambiguity of the decision has the potential to
confuse trial and appellate courts trying to distinguish between testimonial and
nontestimonial evidence.
Davis v. Washington built upon Crawford’s definition of testimonial.94 In
Davis, the Supreme Court considered whether statements made in an
emergency situation qualified as “testimonial” under any of the categories set
out in Crawford.95 The Court decided that statements are nontestimonial when
made during an interrogation if the circumstances objectively indicate that the
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police to respond to an
ongoing emergency.96 Michelle McCottry called a 911 operator and claimed
that Adrian Davis had assaulted her.97 Because the Court determined that the
primary purpose of these statements was to enable police to meet an ongoing
emergency, the recording of the 911 call was considered nontestimonial and,
therefore, admissible, even though Ms. McCottry did not testify at Mr. Davis’s
trial.98 Conversely, statements are testimonial when the circumstances
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objectively indicate that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish
or prove past events potentially relevant to later prosecution or when
statements are an obvious substitute for live testimony because they do
precisely what a witness does on direct examination.99

II. THE INTERSECTION OF CONFRONTATION CLAUSE PRECEDENT
AND FORENSIC EVIDENCE: WHAT IS REQUIRED?
Humans have twenty-three pairs of chromosomes that are contained within
the nucleus of each cell, and these chromosomes make up DNA.100 As
mentioned above, crimes like murder and rape tend to leave the most DNA
evidence behind; consequently, DNA is often gathered, processed, and
presented at murder and rape trials.101 Because it is generally recognized that,
except for identical twins, no two people can have identical sets of base pairs
of DNA,102 the introduction of DNA-related technologies has obvious benefits.
If a DNA profile found at a crime scene matches the DNA profile of a suspect,
evidence of the match is highly probative at trial.
If samples are perfectly handled and gathered, the risk of DNA error is
slight.103 For this reason, DNA profiling technology is also powerful
exculpatory evidence. As of November 2011, for example, 289 imprisoned
individuals had been exonerated through DNA, after having spent, on average,
thirteen years in prison.104 Whatever the reliability of DNA profiling
technology itself, it is undoubtedly compromised by human error.105 The risk
99
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of human error is compounded, especially in murder and rape trials, if the
public views scientific evidence as more reliable than it actually is. Therefore,
although it is undeniably useful, it is extremely important that the public not
consider DNA evidence infallible.
One method that can be used to diminish the adverse effect of human error
in DNA results is to allow a defendant to confront at trial the lab analyst who
performed the test. However, lab analysts who perform the tests often do not
appear in court for reasons detailed in Part III.106 In order to compel lab
analysts to appear for cross-examination, courts must determine that forensic
test results fall into the Crawford definition of “testimonial hearsay.”107 If
forensic test results are deemed testimonial, they cannot be admitted into
evidence without the testimony of the analyst who performed the test.108
Melendez-Diaz took the first step in this direction, finding that a particular type
of forensic evidence constitutes testimonial hearsay.109
A. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts
In 2009, the US Supreme Court held in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts that
“certificates of analysis,” which show the results of a forensic analysis
performed on a seized substance, were within the core class of testimonial
statements that require the lab analyst that performed the test to appear under
Crawford.110 The Court’s opinion in Melendez-Diaz addressed the problem of
categorizing forensic certificates that succinctly state the results of a drug
test.111 While Melendez-Diaz took a step in the direction of clarifying what the
confrontation clause requires with respect to forensic test results,112 it left
many questions unanswered. Due to those perceived ambiguities and
106
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additional concerns for cost and efficiency, many state courts continue to
circumvent the confrontation clause in the forensic context, and thereby
deprive criminal defendants of a constitutional right.113
Mr. Melendez-Diaz was convicted of distributing and trafficking cocaine
without having had the opportunity to confront the analysts who swore to the
results of the forensic analysis performed on substances seized at his arrest.114
Melendez-Diaz’s person was searched, and officers found four clear plastic
bags containing a white substance.115 After he was taken to the police station,
officers searched the police cruiser and found what appeared to be more drugs
hidden in the backseat.116 At trial, the prosecution submitted the certificates of
analysis of the seized substances, which indicated the substance was
cocaine.117 Melendez-Diaz was convicted despite his objections that Crawford
required the analysts who performed the tests to testify in person.118
According to the Supreme Court, the certificates were clearly testimonial
because they had been created for use at trial and qualified as affidavits:
[N]ot only were the affidavits ‘made under circumstances which
would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the
statement would be available for use at a later trial,’ as required by
Crawford, but under Massachusetts law the sole purpose of the
affidavits was to provide ‘prima facie evidence of the composition,
quality, and the net weight’ of the analyzed substance. We can safely
assume that the analysts were aware of the affidavits’ evidentiary
purpose, since that purpose—as stated in the relevant state-law
provision—was reprinted on the affidavits themselves.119
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Additionally, because the certificates were sworn before a notary public,
they qualified as formalized materials and were therefore testimonial.120 Since
the certificates were clearly affidavits, the Court could have ended its analysis
there. But in order to prevent its holding from being cabined to sworn
statements, the Court also looked to the primary purpose of the certificates; it
emphasized that, without the formality of an affidavit, a statement’s primary
purpose can still render it testimonial.121 Here, the primary purpose was to
provide information about an illegal substance that could be used against the
defendant at trial. Because there was “little doubt” that the certificates fell
within the core class of testimonial statements described in Crawford, the case
was reversed and remanded so that the lab analyst could appear to testify.122
Though it was not an extension of Crawford, Melendez-Diaz was significant
in that it signaled the Court’s unwillingness to create a forensic evidence
exception to the Crawford rule. The Court discussed and rebutted all six of
Massachusetts’s main arguments, which revealed the majority’s attitude
toward confrontation requirements in the forensic evidence context. First, the
State argued that lab analysts are not subject to confrontation because they are
not accusatory witnesses.123 Because analysts’ statements alone are insufficient
to convict, the State argued, the statements only incriminate an individual to
the extent that the other evidence links the defendant to the results.124 The
Court rejected this argument, responding that any witness’s testimony alone is
usually insufficient to convict.125
The State’s second argument, that lab analysts are not “conventional
witnesses,” stemmed from the concept developed in Davis that statements are
nontestimonial when made as an event is being witnessed and testimonial
120
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when the event being recounted happened in the past. Unlike conventional
witnesses, the State argued, in performing the test, the lab analyst was making
near-contemporaneous observations, which rendered the observations
nontestimonial under Davis.126 The Court countered that the “nearcontemporaneous” nature of the test did not make it actually contemporaneous;
it concluded that exempting all witnesses who did not observe the crime from
testifying would effectively exempt all expert witnesses, which the Court was
unwilling to do.127
Additionally, the Court disagreed with the State’s arguments that the
analysts were immune from confrontation because the results fell within a
business record hearsay exception and the defendant failed to subpoena the
analyst.128 The Court reasoned that, where a business record is created for use
at trial, the existence of a hearsay exception is irrelevant for confrontation
purposes.129 Regarding the defendant’s failure to subpoena the analyst, the
Court concluded that where confrontation is at issue, the burden is on the
prosecution to produce adverse witnesses in court.130
Next, the Court dismissed the State’s argument that individual states would
be overly burdened if the tests were considered testimonial.131 Citing both the
right to trial by jury and the privilege against self-incrimination as examples,
the Court responded that it was without authority to relax constitutional
requirements simply because the prosecution was overburdened.132 It also
reasoned that the burden would not be as severe as was depicted by the State
and the dissent.133
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Finally, and most significantly, the Court rejected the State’s argument that
lab analysts were exempt from cross-examination because such evidence is
“neutral [and] scientific” in nature, and thus the benefits of cross-examining
analysts are minimal.134 The Court recognized that the State was, in essence,
asking it to revert back to the Roberts indicia of reliability test in the area of
forensic evidence by making an exception for “reliable” evidence.135 While
reiterating that Crawford requires that reliability only be tested through crossexamination, no matter how reliable the source, the Court also detailed a recent
National Research Council of the National Academies study, which reported
widespread error and bias within the forensic testing context.136 Because the
Court did not need to discuss the reliability of the forensic evidence in order to
deem the certificates testimonial, this section of the opinion is especially
significant. This discussion points to the majority’s recognition of overreliance
on forensic evidence and indicates that it could continue to treat forensic
evidence as testimonial in future decisions.
B. Why the Majority Was Right
1. Lab Analysts Are Human, Too
As demonstrated by the National Research Council of the National
Academies study mentioned in Melendez-Diaz, there are serious issues with
accuracy in forensic labs and very few safeguards in place to ferret out
errors.137 The reliability of forensic testing depends on the quality of the DNA
being tested; “the care with which it is collected, labeled, and transported; the
standards and quality-control procedures of the laboratories performing the
DNA profile analysis; and the interpretation of the DNA analyzer data,”
134
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including whether a partial profile (only part of the DNA sequence) or a mixed
profile (more than one donor) is obtained.138 Opportunities for errors abound in
the collection, handling, and storage stages, and such errors can result in false
positives.139 It is clear that the results of even reliable forensic testing methods,
like DNA testing, can be inaccurate or flawed.140
Additionally, the lack of comprehensive forensic lab oversight combined
with the knowledge that any mistake or indiscretion is unlikely to be
discovered may contribute to analysts being less careful or honest than they
would be otherwise. Many forensic labs are accountable to the state and report
to the prosecution,141 and analysts may feel pressured to come to certain
conclusions. Although it may imply a cynical conclusion, in a report that
examined the trials of 137 individuals that were found guilty and later
exonerated, researchers found that most of the analysts that performed the
incriminating tests used in the trials were employed by state or local law
enforcement crime laboratories.142 Further, in high-profile cases, it is possible
that analysts will hear about the cases they are working on and develop their
own unintentional biases.
While there have been many examples of particularly egregious cases of
dishonest or incompetent analysts and labs,143 proficiency tests suggest that the
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true false-positive error rate in DNA testing is 1–2 percent.144 While low
compared to other forensic technology, this error rate is still incredibly
threatening to defendants, especially if the jury considers forensic evidence
infallible. Certainly cross-examination is not sufficient to completely combat
this margin of error, but it remains a necessary precaution. Because of the risk
of error and the high stakes involved with forensic testing in criminal
prosecutions, the reasoning underlying the Court’s decision in Melendez-Diaz
is understandable and rational. There should be no question that the performing
analyst must testify in court.
2. “Results” Are Often the Analyst’s Subjective Interpretation of the Test
“Results” of forensic tests are not always clear—they require interpretation
and analysis.145 Because analysts will interpret and analyze test results
differently, a specific analyst’s unique interpretation process can be revealed
through cross-examination. In the same way that several eyewitnesses to the
same event often have different conclusions about the specifics of the event,
different analysts testing the same sample can reach different conclusions
based on their subjective interpretations.
There is no standard rule for how an analyst should interpret and report
ambiguous DNA results.146 Ambiguity can result when samples are
compromised, when they are declared a match based on less than 100 percent
certainty, when they are erroneously tested against and therefore show a
perfect match, and when they contain evidence of other DNA profiles that are
left unexplored. “Where degradation has occurred . . . the profile might be
considered incomplete. One analyst might decide that these measurements are
spurious and unreliable and might report this result as ‘inconclusive,’ while
http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2010/11/19/20101119arizona-crime-labsreform.html.
144
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another might report a partial profile.”147 Indeed, studies of the data underlying
reports frequently reveal limitations or problems that are not apparent from the
analyst’s report alone.148 “When faced with ambiguous situations, crime lab
analysts frequently slant their interpretations in ways that support prosecution
theories.”149 Without the opportunity for cross-examination, subjective forensic
determinations are easily interpreted by the jury as fact.
3. Jurors’ Tendency to Accept Scientific Evidence as Determinative
That jurors may be more likely to view forensic evidence results as truth due
to trial depictions in the media has been referred to as the “CSI Effect.”150 This
concept is supported by depictions of the infallibility of forensic science on
television shows like CSI: Crime Scene Investigation.151 Researchers suggest
that jurors want to “resolve tensions associated with uncorrected injustice” and
could therefore be motivated to search for ways to “legitimate their desires to
convict.”152 Forensic evidence, especially DNA evidence, can provide that
avenue. Further, it can be more “psychologically satisfying” to convict rather
than acquit; while there is a desire to acquit the innocent, there is a competing
desire to achieve justice for the victim (and therefore punish the defendant).153
Because of the desire to correct an injustice, it may be difficult for a juror to
see, especially during a trial for a heinous crime, that both the victim and the
defendant deserve a just outcome.154 In the defendant’s case, a just outcome
147
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requires a dedication to truth seeking throughout the trial. Cross-examination
of the analyst that performed a forensic test used in a trial is therefore
necessary to help prevent the effects of what one scholar calls “the motivation
to convict.”155 In requiring that lab analysts testify in court, jurors are less
likely to take scientific evidence as fact, and, accordingly, more likely to
preserve their role as fact finders.
C. The Melendez-Diaz Dissent: Wrong about the Requirements of the
Confrontation Clause, but Perhaps Understandable in its Concern with the
Practical Implications of the Majority’s Decision
1. Melendez-Diaz Elucidated, But Did Not Expand upon, the Definition
of ‘Testimonial’ Set out in Crawford and Davis
In Justice Kennedy’s dissent, joined by Justice Roberts, Justice Breyer, and
Justice Alito, he argues that Melendez-Diaz “undoes” law governing the
admission of scientific evidence, which had been established for ninety
years.156 The dissent distinguishes Melendez-Diaz from both Crawford and
Davis because those cases involved “conventional witnesses,” though that
phrase is never relied upon or mentioned in the decisions of Crawford or
Davis.157 Including scientific evidence in the “testimonial” definition and
considering a lab analyst as a witness were concepts certainly not precluded by
either Crawford or Davis. The dissent claims that the holding in MelendezDiaz is “driven by nothing more than a wooden application of the Crawford
and Davis definition of ‘testimonial,’ divorced from any guidance from
history, precedent, or common sense”158 simply because neither Crawford nor
Davis specifically indicated whether lab analysts and their testimony would
qualify as testimonial. This argument, however, fails to explain why the
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certificates at issue did not fall within the core testimonial evidence established
in Crawford and Davis.
Categorizing forensic certificates as testimonial does follow from Crawford
and Davis: the certificates were formal affidavits, the assertions contained in
the certificates were made under circumstances that would lead an objective
witness to reasonably believe that the statement would be available for use at a
later trial, and the certificates were the functional equivalent to live, in-court
testimony.159 Both Justice Kennedy and Justice Breyer joined the Crawford
majority,160 and all four of the Justices in the Melendez-Diaz dissent joined the
majority opinion in Davis.161 While the fact that the rules set out in Crawford
and Davis rejected the indicia of reliability test from Ohio v. Roberts may
appear startling, every dissenting justice at one point thought it a necessary
change to make.
2. The Majority’s Holding Does Advance the Purposes of the
Confrontation Clause
The dissent claims that confronting a laboratory analyst will not cause the
analyst to change his or her opinion due to the analyst’s neutrality.162 The
dissent’s position is that an analyst would not retract a prior conclusion upon
seeing the defendant, as a “conventional witness” might, because an analyst is
far removed from the situation and claims no personal investment in the
defendant’s guilt.163 This argument, however, goes to the heart of how many
have come to view scientific evidence. In assuming that test results are simply
objective, neutral facts, the dissent sees requiring an analyst to testify as a
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meaningless charade, or, worse, as a way to let the guilty “go free.”164 In fact,
as discussed above, subjective opinions, outside evidence, and innocent
mistakes contribute to erroneous test results, and a defendant, whose liberty is
at stake, deserves to have the opportunity to cross-examine the test-performing
analyst in order to uncover any possible errors or sources of bias.
The dissent also distinguishes lab analysts from conventional witnesses in
that a lab analyst typically does not respond to questions under interrogation—
“they are not dependent upon or controlled by interrogation of any sort.”165
While not subject to specific interrogation methods of state officers, forensic
labs and analysts will likely only perform a forensic analysis if prompted to by
police officers or the prosecution, to whom they are often accountable.166 To
argue that a defendant should not be able to confront a lab analyst because the
analyst is completely independent is to disregard the reality of how the forensic
testing system is often structured.
3. Application of Crawford Does Not Impose an Undue Burden on the
States
Of all the dissent’s criticisms, its most significant argument (and perhaps the
concern underlying its other arguments) is that Melendez-Diaz’s application of
Crawford to forensic evidence will have an unduly burdensome effect on
states. Indeed, Melendez-Diaz has already made some criminal prosecutions
less efficient.167 And requiring analysts that may have no recollection of
164
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performing a specific forensic test to appear to testify may, at first blush, seem
like a waste of time. However, even those analysts who truly do not remember
a specific analysis can provide valuable information on cross-examination, like
his or her particular interpretation methods or precision. Confrontation “‘was
meant to weed out [both] the fraudulent analyst and the incompetent one . . .’
The incompetent analyst can be weeded out whether or not she has a memory
of performing the test” and, for the fraudulent analyst, “just the prospect of
being called to the stand and subjected to cross-examination may well deter
some fraud from ever occurring.”168
Any inefficiency caused by Melendez-Diaz is not only surmountable, but
may cause the forensic testing process to change in ways that make the results
themselves more accurate. States that hope to avoid having to require multiple
analysts who work on a sample to testify could change procedures so that only
one analyst performs tests on a sample and interprets the results, and a
supervisor (who cannot testify) verifies the results. This would decrease the
chance of sample adulteration through degradation and still ensure that more
than one individual has checked and verified the results. Especially in the drug
context, Melendez-Diaz may also force the state to prosecute the most serious
charges first. For instance, Massachusetts recently decriminalized possession
of one ounce or less of marijuana—this means that analysts are no longer using
lab time to analyze drugs in most marijuana possession cases.169 This time can
now be more efficiently spent on work related to more serious charges.
Of course, at bottom, “convenience and efficiency are not the primary
objectives—or the hallmarks—of democratic government.”170 As one scholar
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aptly points out, “one may not very well argue that we should do away with the
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, the right to a trial by
jury, or the right to confront witnesses because things would be cheaper and
quicker if we did away with them.”171 Once a constitutional right comes into
play, the practical consequences of recognizing that right are no longer a
concern of the Court; after Crawford, whether forensic evidence is testimonial
cannot be driven by policy considerations.172 In sum, it may be that the
dissent’s reluctance to consider forensic evidence testimonial, cloaked in
disputes over “conventional witnesses” and the minimal benefit derived in
confronting a lab analyst, is a result of the perceived inefficiency of MelendezDiaz and the possibility of high costs to states. However, the “enormous”173
change required by Crawford and its progeny in the way forensic evidence is
admitted in criminal trials simply highlights the extent to which defendants
have been deprived of their confrontation rights in the past; this change should
have been implemented long ago. In absolutely every case in which forensic
testimony is admitted against an individual, that individual should have the
opportunity to cross-examine the creator of the forensic testimony.

III. CIRCUMVENTING MELENDEZ-DIAZ
Under Crawford, Davis, and Melendez-Diaz, where the primary purpose of a
forensic report is its use in a future criminal proceeding, the analyst’s report
cannot be admitted into evidence unless the analyst-witness is both unavailable
and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.174 While the
apparent vagueness surrounding the definitions of “testimony” and who
constitutes a “witness” in the forensic testing context has undoubtedly
contributed to confusion among lower courts, the real issue seems to be the
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perceived inefficiency and cost of applying the clear rule, and the lingering
belief that forensic testing always produces accurate results. This section will
detail a common method states are using to avoid being bound by this new
case law and two Supreme Court cases that deal with the constitutionality of
lab analysts not testifying.
A. “Stealth Testimonial Hearsay”175
Oddly, even after Crawford, it is a fairly common practice for judges to
allow expert witnesses to testify regarding the expert’s opinion of testimonial
evidence that would otherwise be inadmissible. For example, the prosecution
may hire an expert witness to review a forensic report and testify in court
regarding her opinion of that report; the lab analyst herself is not required to
appear in court. The actual report may or may not be admitted into evidence. In
what Julie Seaman calls “stealth testimonial hearsay,” inadmissible hearsay is
“smuggled in” through the expert’s opinion.176 Absent confrontation concerns,
this practice is permitted under Evidence Rule (ER) 703, which provides:
[t]he facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases
an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to
the expert at or before the hearing. . . . If of a type reasonably relied
upon by experts in a particular field in forming opinions or inferences
upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence
in order for the opinion or inference to be admitted.177
Thus, ER 703 allows the expert to base her opinion on facts unique to the case
and not found by or even known to the jury.178
ER 703’s “reasonably relied upon” standard (that is, the requirement that the
facts or data are of a type reasonably relied on in forming opinions on the
subject), which would be easily met for most types of forensic evidence, is
175
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obviously very similar to the indicia of reliability test overruled in Roberts. In
the same way that the Roberts test took away the defendant’s opportunity to
cross-examine witnesses by admitting hearsay if the judge deemed it reliable,
so ER 703 takes away both the jury’s and the defendant’s opportunities to
assess the reliability of the underlying report—the expert need only find the
report reasonably reliable, and it can be admitted without the creator of the
report present to testify.
Clearly, however, testimonial hearsay that is admissible under the Rules of
Evidence is not admissible if it violates the Constitution. Trial courts have
rejected constitutional challenges to stealth testimonial hearsay, though,
reasoning that, even if testimonial, the underlying reports are not hearsay (an
out-of-court statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted) because the
reports are offered as a basis for experts’ opinions and not for the truth of the
matter asserted (the results of the report).179 Crawford only governs testimonial
hearsay.180 This completely immunizes the report itself from crossexamination, since the analyst will not be required to appear. While proponents
of this method have argued that Crawford is satisfied because the expert
witness is present to be cross-examined, the only testimony that is legitimately
available for the defense to question is the expert’s personal opinion of the
report. When the forensic test result report is not itself admitted and the expert
bases her opinion on the report, courts reason that Crawford is not violated
because the report is simply acting as the basis for the expert’s opinion, and
not offered for its truth—therefore, according to these courts, while the report
is testimonial, it is not hearsay, and does not come within Crawford’s reach.181
Stealth testimonial hearsay violates the defendant’s right to confront
witnesses. The argument that the report is not hearsay because it is not offered
for its truth when it provides the basis for an expert’s opinion is a fiction. The
jury cannot realistically be expected to assess the validity of the expert’s
179
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opinion without considering the truth of the underlying report, especially when
coupled with the possible tendency jurors may have to take forensic evidence
as fact.182 The outcome of Mr. Lui’s case, detailed above, will likely turn on
whether the Supreme Court of the United States is willing to accept this fiction
or whether it will recognize that this practice violates Crawford. The Court
began to answer this question in Bullcoming v. New Mexico, below, and has
the opportunity to clearly answer it in Williams v. Illinois.
B. Bullcoming v. New Mexico183
Bullcoming presented a similar, but not identical question to the stealth
testimonial hearsay issue presented in Lui: when a forensic report is offered
into evidence to prove its truth, is a defendant’s confrontation right satisfied
when a supervisor with no role in producing the report appears and is subject
to cross-examination regarding the report?184 This question arose out of a 2005
driving-while-intoxicated case in New Mexico in which blood was drawn and
used against the defendant in court.185
Donald Bullcoming had rear-ended a truck; there were no injuries and only
minor damage to the vehicles.186 However, he left the scene and the driver of
the truck called the police.187 Police quickly found Mr. Bullcoming and noticed
that he appeared intoxicated.188 After he declined to submit to field sobriety
tests and a breath test, the police drove him to a local hospital where his blood
was drawn.189 The blood sample was signed in and stored, and analyst Curtis
Caylor tested the sample the next day.190 In his report, Mr. Caylor wrote down
that the blood sample contained an alcohol concentration of .21 grams per
182
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hundred milliliters, declared that the seal of the sample was received intact and
broken in the laboratory, and certified that he followed the procedures required
on the report.191
Mr. Bullcoming was charged with Driving While Intoxicated.192 On the day
of the trial, the state informed Mr. Bullcoming that the analyst who performed
the forensic test, Curtis Caylor, would not be testifying and that Gerasimos
Razatos, another analyst, would be testifying instead.193 There was no claim
made that Mr. Caylor was unavailable.194 Mr. Bullcoming argued that this
substitution violated the confrontation clause under Crawford.195 The trial
court disagreed on the grounds that the report did not fall under Crawford’s
definition of “testimonial” and it admitted the report under the business record
exception to the hearsay rule.196
The report was admitted and another analyst, Mr. Razatos, was allowed to
testify.197 On cross-examination, Mr. Razatos conceded that he had not
observed the testing or reviewed Mr. Caylor’s analysis in the lab and stated
that “you don’t know unless you actually observe the analysis that someone
else conducts, whether they followed the protocol in every instance.”198
Interestingly, Mr. Razatos also revealed that Mr. Caylor had been put on
unpaid leave.199 Nonetheless, Mr. Bullcoming was found guilty and sentenced
to two years in prison, and the conviction was affirmed on appeal.200 The New
Mexico Supreme Court granted certiorari, but while the case was pending, the
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US Supreme Court held in Melendez-Diaz that forensic reports are
testimonial.201
Despite the outcome of the Melendez-Diaz decision, the New Mexico
Supreme Court still did not acknowledge that Mr. Bullcoming’s right to
confrontation had been violated. While forced to concede that the report was
testimonial, the court shifted the question to the sufficiency of the testimony of
the surrogate witness, Mr. Razatos:202 the New Mexico Supreme Court held
that Mr. Ratatos’s in-court testimony was sufficient to satisfy the defendant’s
right to confront witnesses against him.203
Allowing a substitute, unrelated analyst to appear in the place of the lab
analyst who performed a test violated the defendant’s rights under the
confrontation clause for the reasons stated in the preceding sections. The way
this case went through the state system, however, is especially telling. First, the
trial court held that the evidence was nontestimonial, and so Crawford did not
apply.204 When Crawford had to apply—that is, when the US Supreme Court
clearly held that forensic certificates of analysis are testimonial—the New
Mexico Supreme Court used yet another strategy, taking the stance that an
unrelated, substitute lab analyst is a “witness,” in order to artificially comply
with the Crawford framework.205 The New Mexico Supreme Court went to
great lengths to avoid complying with the clear confrontation requirement.
The question at issue in Bullcoming and the treatment of that question in the
lower state courts are likely results of the concepts discussed in this article: a
still-prevalent idea that forensic results are unwaveringly accurate, the general
desire to convict defendants when a wrong has occurred, and cost and
efficiency concerns. In holding that the confrontation clause is not satisfied
when an analyst who did not perform or observe the test presented testifies and
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that a defendant has the right to confront the analyst who performed the test
unless the analyst is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity for
cross-examination, the US Supreme Court took the appropriate first step of
answering who must testify by applying the basic principles of Crawford and
Melendez-Diaz concerning what is testimonial hearsay. The underlying
principle of Crawford—that a defendant is not afforded a fair trial when he is
denied the opportunity to confront the witness against him—is what should be
honored, no matter what technology is involved.
C. Williams v. Illinois
The facts of Williams are as follows. In 2000, a woman was raped and
robbed.206 A rape kit was sent to the Illinois State Police Crime lab for
testing.207 The lab confirmed the presence of semen, and the sample was sent
to Cellmark Diagnostic Laboratory in Maryland, who derived a DNA
profile.208 The defendant was later arrested for an unrelated offense and,
pursuant to a court order, his blood was drawn, tested, and a DNA profile
derived.209 The profile was entered into the crime lab’s DNA database.210 A
forensic biologist who did not have a part in either test testified that the DNA
profile from the semen sample and the profile from the defendant’s blood
sample matched.211 As an expert witness, the biologist testified to the match at
the defendant’s trial, and neither of the individuals who performed the
underlying DNA tests testified.212 While the expert’s testimony was certainly
important for the purpose of cross-examination regarding her personal opinion
that the two samples matched, the testimony of the analysts that created the
underlying DNA profiles was important for the purpose of cross-examination
206
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2011) (No. 10-8505).
207
Id.
208
Id. at 271.
209
Id. at 270.
210
Id.
211
Id. at 271.
212
Id.

VOLUME 10 • ISSUE 2 • 2012

922 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

regarding the creation of that profile that led to the match. Without this
underlying testimony, the expert’s testimony constituted stealth testimonial
hearsay.
To predict how Williams may come out, Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in
Bullcoming is significant. While Justice Ginsburg led the Court in the
application of Crawford and Melendez-Diaz to Mr. Bullcoming’s situation in a
5-4 decision, Justice Sotomayor hinted that she is ready to draw a line in
Williams. Besides offering a proposal that states may suggest a purpose for a
report besides its use at trial,213 which would avoid a confrontation problem
under Crawford’s and Davis’s definitions of “testimonial,” Justice Sotomayor
emphasized that the rule in Bullcoming may be limited to its narrow facts.214 In
Bullcoming, the surrogate witness that testified to the results of the forensic
report had no role in producing the report or observing the testing. Sotomayor
said that “it would be a different case if” either 1) a supervisor who observed
an analyst conduct the test testified about the results of the report, or 2) an
expert witness testified as to her independent opinion about the underlying
reports not admitted into evidence (stealth testimonial hearsay), both of which
would insulate the actual analyst from cross-examination.215 Two justices in
the Melendez-Diaz majority (Justice Stevens and Justice Souter) have since
been replaced with Justice Kagan and Justice Sotomayor. The four MelendezDiaz dissenters are all still on the Court. Therefore, Justice Sotomayor could
join the Melendez-Diaz dissent to create a majority if she believes that stealth
testimonial hearsay is acceptable.
Despite Justice Sotomayor’s hint that an expert’s testimony can satisfy the
defendant’s right to confront the analyst who created a forensic report, not
considering a report hearsay because it was not admitted but was used by an
213
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expert witness to arrive at her opinion is illogical because the defendant is no
less threatened by the report and is prevented from confronting the testing
analyst(s). If the underlying test results are incorrect, so are the expert’s
opinions about the results. Instead, this situation should still be resolved by
looking to Crawford’s basic rule: testimonial hearsay is inadmissible unless a
witness is unavailable and the defendant has had a prior opportunity for crossexamination.216 The Court should continue to apply the basic principles of
Crawford and Melendez-Diaz to Williams, finding that underlying reports are
still testimonial even if they are not admitted and only provide a basis for an
expert witness’s “independent opinion”—and should find the admission of
stealth testimonial hearsay unconstitutional.

IV. CHANGES IN FORENSIC STRUCTURE AND PROSECUTORIAL
PRACTICES THAT MAY AID WITH CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
COMPLIANCE
While the cost and efficiency of recognizing a constitutional right is not a
concern of the Court, the volume of articles and briefs that focus on possible
costs and inefficiencies of requiring a lab analyst to appear at trial indicate that
practical concerns do indeed impact this issue. In an amicus brief submitted on
behalf of the respondent in Bullcoming, various state actors argued that
requiring the prosecution to call the author of a forensic report it seeks to admit
against a defendant would inhibit the development of efficient laboratory
procedures that involve more than one centralized analyst.217 There is a
growing practice in forensic laboratories to use “high-volume processing” of
evidence samples, meaning teams of analysts work on many samples instead of
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just one.218 Therefore, multiple analysts are responsible for one result of a test
in a given case.
It is true that requiring an entire team of analysts that worked on a single
sample to appear, which could arguably be required under Crawford and
Melendez-Diaz, would be a significant cost to states. However, this “highvolume processing” practice is itself questionable. When multiple analysts are
responsible for different parts of the data-collecting process, the process is at
an even greater risk of being inaccurate: there may be too many cooks in the
kitchen. If the Supreme Court deems stealth testimonial hearsay
unconstitutional in Williams, forcing lab analysts to appear in court, it would
likely discourage high-volume processing, which would in turn likely help
improve accuracy of the forensic testing process. Having only one lab analyst
work on a sample is the norm in many jurisdictions. For example, in
Washington State, only one analyst will work on a sample.219 Testifying in
court based on that sample “is not characterized as imposing on analysts an
additional demand separable from their case work”—it is just part of the job.220
Requiring that the author of a forensic report appear in court would place
considerable pressure on jurisdictions using high-volume processing, which
would reduce the number of analysts working on a sample and could increase
accuracy in results.
Somewhat related is the notion that specifically requiring the author of a
forensic report to appear in court will cause states to suffer an overwhelming
cost. The Bullcoming amicus brief submitted on behalf of the State also cites to
this cost and the burden on lab analysts as a reason that the specific lab analyst
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who performed a test should not be required to appear in court.221 The general
idea is that, “in the real world of modern forensic toxicology analysis,” this
practice is just not feasible.222 Again, however, the practices of many states
demonstrate that the amicus claim simply is not true.223 Examples of cities that
already call the analysts who examined the evidence, drew the conclusion, or
wrote the report are: Baltimore, Maryland; Denver, Colorado; San Francisco,
California; Oakland, California; Seattle, Washington; Chicago, Illinois; and
Anchorage, Alaska.224
This practice is a result of a general recognition on the part of prosecutors
that the analyst who produced the report is an important source of
incriminating evidence against the defendant; relatedly, the analyst that
produced the report is often the prosecution’s most powerful witness.225 The
prosecution often calls the analyst to testify in order to strengthen its case.226
While all jurisdictions that already require the analyst that performed the test to
appear “have their own unique demands and challenges,” “all of them
manage.”227 The burden of requiring the author of a forensic report to appear is
further assuaged by placing analysts on call so that they can come to the
courthouse just before their testimony is needed, by allowing the analyst’s
testimony to be taken out of order when she arrives, and by efforts made by
prosecutors to schedule multiple cases for the same day.228
Finally, besides the fact that stealth testimonial hearsay is based on a fiction
that a forensic report providing the basis for an expert’s opinion is not hearsay
because it is not offered for its truth, allowing experts to testify instead of the
lab analyst who actually performed the test would discourage lab analysts from
221
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ever testifying at all. In the forensic context, Crawford and Melendez-Diaz
could be rendered meaningless. While having the lab analyst is a powerful tool
for the prosecution, an expert witness testifying to the results is undoubtedly a
more powerful one. Any expert witness could testify as to her opinion
regarding the results of the test, and, because of misconceptions regarding the
accuracy of forensic evidence discussed above, jurors would be likely to listen.
Since lab analysts who performed the tests would no longer be required to
testify, the potential beneficial changes in forensic testing practices that could
lead to more accurate results (reducing the number of analysts that work on a
sample) would not occur. In cases involving forensic evidence, therefore,
Williams has the capacity to make Crawford and Melendez-Diaz a flash in the
pan.

CONCLUSION
The indisputable value of DNA and other forensic technologies, and the
potential costs of complying with Crawford and Melendez-Diaz, should not
corrode a criminal defendant’s invaluable right to confront witnesses against
him. Like any other type of evidence, there is the risk of error, which is
exacerbated by forensic evidence’s perceived infallibility and various methods
used by states to evade Crawford, namely stealth testimonial hearsay. An
interest in the accuracy of criminal proceedings where forensic evidence has
been admitted and our notions of a fair trial require a measured approach to
interpreting new technologies as they make their way into the courtroom. To
make sure that defendants like Mr. Lui receive fair trials in the face of damning
forensic evidence, the need for confrontation of the lab analyst behind the
testing process is plain.
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